The Wire
U.S. sanctions Myanmar armed group leaders over scam-centre links
Washington froze the assets of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army’s commander-in-chief and a second officer on Thursday, accusing the militia of guarding cyber-scam compounds and abusing trafficked workers inside them. The action also hit a Cambodian operator and two of his companies.
Key points
- The action: The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned three people and two companies on Thursday 19 November 2026; General Saw Shwe Wah and Colonel Saw A One of Myanmar’s Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Cambodian operator Zhao Hui, and Zhao’s two Phnom Penh companies. 1
- The Myanmar charge: Treasury says DKBA actors “not only provide security for scam compounds and permit their continued operation, but also actively participate in violence against victims of human trafficking trapped inside the compounds.” 1
- The commanders: Saw Shwe Wah has led the DKBA since December 2025, replacing General Saw Steel, whom Washington sanctioned the previous month. Saw A One runs security at Three Pagodas Pass in Karen State, near the Thai border, and reportedly owns a plantation where scam operations take place. 3
- The Cambodian operator: Zhao Hui, 35, a China-born naturalised Cambodian, leased a scam centre owned by the Prince Group conglomerate and paid protection fees to its leader, Chen Zhi. He owned a second compound in Cambodia and ran it directly, targeting Americans and Europeans with virtual-currency investment scams. 4
- The scale: The State Department says Southeast Asian scam centres, most of them run by Chinese organised crime groups, stole an estimated $18.2 billion from Americans in 2025. Reporting on the Treasury action also cites $7.2 billion for crypto-investment fraud. 2
ONE EVENT. THREE READINGS.
In Washington, the action reads as consumer protection with a security edge.
The State Department’s statement leads with the American victims, $18.2 billion stolen in a single year, and frames the compounds as foreign-backed criminal networks preying on Americans through fraud and extortion.
What this reading highlights: The coordination list says it all: the FBI, the DEA, the Justice Department’s Strike Force and the Homeland Security Task Force, all pointed at the same target.
More designations will follow, the administration warns.
Sources: U.S. Department of the Treasury (1), U.S. Department of State (1), Reuters (1)
From East Asia, the story reads as a problem the region has exported to itself.
The State Department says most of the centres are run by Chinese organised crime groups; China took back the Prince Group’s founder, Chen Zhi, in January after Cambodia extradited him.
What this reading highlights: Hong Kong and Indian coverage has carried the facts straight, without Washington’s triumphalism; the designations, the names, the $18.2 billion figure.
The question in Beijing, Tokyo and Singapore is whether they will work: the industry has already shown it can move, shrinking into smaller facilities in new locations whenever pressure arrives.
Sources: The Standard (1)
From the countries where the compounds stand, it is an old story: outsiders profiting from lawless borderlands while the people inside pay.
Myanmar’s exile press, The Irrawaddy, reporting from the Thai border, calls the DKBA “regime-allied” and notes that the raids on KK Park, Shwe Kokko and Myawaddy were widely dismissed as a publicity stunt.
What this reading highlights: The South’s question is the one Washington does not answer: what happens to the trafficked workers when a compound is sanctioned but not closed; and who is coming to get them out.
Sources: The Hindu (1), The Irrawaddy (1), Phnom Penh Post (1)
Sources by lens: 3 West, 1 East, 3 Global South. See every source
THE POINT OF CONVERGENCE
On the facts. On Thursday 19 November 2026 the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC sanctioned three people and two companies over Southeast Asian cyber-scam centres: DKBA commander-in-chief General Saw Shwe Wah, Colonel Saw A One, Cambodian operator Zhao Hui, and Zhao’s two Phnom Penh companies. The DKBA was already designated in November 2025, and the State Department says the centres stole an estimated $18.2 billion from Americans in 2025.
WHAT REMAINS CONTESTED
On whether the sanctions will work. Washington presents them as disruption of the networks that enable the compounds, and points to the Strike Force with Thailand and the extradition of the Prince Group’s founder as proof the campaign bites. Sceptics note the pattern so far is displacement, not dismantlement: after the Myawaddy raids the operators moved south to Phaya Thonezu, and the industry keeps shrinking into smaller facilities in new locations. The disagreement is not about the designations; it is about whether sanctioning the protectors closes compounds or just moves them.
The story
Five names, two countries, one crackdown
The United States moved on Thursday 19 November against the armed men and the businessman Washington says keep Southeast Asia’s scam compounds running, freezing the assets of two commanders of Myanmar’s Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and a Cambodian operator. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) named three people and two companies in a single action; the latest strike against the fraud compounds along Myanmar’s Thai border and across Cambodia.
The two Myanmar commanders are General Saw Shwe Wah, the DKBA’s commander-in-chief, and Colonel Saw A One, who runs security in the Three Pagodas Pass area of Karen State, near the Thai border. The Cambodian target is Zhao Hui, a 35-year-old China-born naturalised Cambodian who Washington says leased a scam centre from the Prince Group conglomerate, paid protection money to its leader, and ran a second compound of his own. His two Phnom Penh companies were designated for being owned or controlled by him.
The designations freeze any property the five hold in the United States or under the control of Americans, and any entity they own 50 per cent or more of is blocked too. “Under President Trump’s leadership, Treasury has aggressively targeted overseas scam compounds to protect Americans from fraud,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.
Who was sanctioned; and what is each of them accused of?
Washington’s case against Zhao Hui is the most detailed part of the action. Treasury says he leased a scam centre owned by the Prince Group, the conglomerate Washington calls a transnational criminal organisation, and paid protection fees to its leader, Chen Zhi. He also owned a second compound in Cambodia outright, was directly involved in its operations and managed its leases. Both compounds ran virtual-currency investment scams aimed at Americans and Europeans.
The case against the DKBA is about protection, not operation. Treasury says the group’s actors “not only provide security for scam compounds and permit their continued operation, but also actively participate in violence against victims of human trafficking trapped inside the compounds.” Saw Shwe Wah has commanded the group since December 2025, when he replaced General Saw Steel, whom Washington sanctioned the previous month. Saw A One oversees security at Three Pagodas Pass, where Treasury says new buildings for telecom scam operations have been going up.
The money is the reason Washington keeps returning to this target. The State Department says scam centres in Southeast Asia, most of them run by Chinese organised crime groups, stole an estimated $18.2 billion from Americans in 2025. The action was coordinated with the Justice Department’s Scam Center Strike Force, the FBI, the DEA and Homeland Security.
“Under President Trump’s leadership, Treasury has aggressively targeted overseas scam compounds to protect Americans from fraud,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.
What don’t the designations prove?
The first unknown is whether any of this closes a single compound. Sanctions freeze assets under American jurisdiction; the DKBA holds its territory in Myanmar, and its income comes from the compounds themselves; from leases, protection fees and the businesses that serve them. None of the five targets had publicly responded by Friday, and The Irrawaddy could not reach DKBA headquarters for comment.
The second unknown is the human arithmetic; and the money. At least seven major compounds were under DKBA protection in 2025, according to The Irrawaddy, but restrictions on movement make the exact number of sites and workers hard to establish. The figures, too, do not line up: the State Department puts the 2025 toll on Americans at $18.2 billion, while reporting on the Treasury action cites $7.2 billion, and neither agency has said publicly what the second figure covers.
The third unknown is what the region’s governments will do. The State Department has called on them to shut down the operations, prosecute their leaders, owners and protectors, and identify and assist trafficking victims. Cambodia extradited the Prince Group’s founder, Chen Zhi, to China in January. But the pattern so far has been displacement, not dismantlement: after raids on KK Park, Shwe Kokko and Myawaddy, the operators moved south to Phaya Thonezu.
The scam economy now has armed guards; and Washington is treating the guards as the target
This action matters because it changes the target. Until now the campaign has aimed mainly at the operators, the Prince Group, its founder Chen Zhi, the Karen National Army’s Saw Chit Thu. The DKBA designations aim at the protectors: the armed group that sells security to the compounds, takes a cut and, Washington says, beats workers who try to leave. Sanctioning the guards is an admission that the compounds are not a policing problem but a political economy, a business that pays for armed protection because that protection is what makes it possible.
It matters, too, because of the scale and the victims. The workforce inside them is in many cases trafficked; lured with job offers, held behind walls, forced to defraud strangers online. The DKBA’s alleged violence against those workers is what turns a fraud story into a human-trafficking story, and it is the trafficking charge that gives the sanctions their moral weight. Myanmar was in the dock this week for another reason: the International Court of Justice ruled on Thursday that it committed genocide against the Rohingya.
And it matters as a test of American reach. The designations bite only where American jurisdiction runs; on bank accounts, on companies that touch the dollar system, on anyone doing business with the United States. The real pressure is indirect: on the banks that clear the compounds’ money, and on the Thai and Cambodian officials who decide whether to raid or look away. If those levers do not move, the designations will be a press release, not a disruption.
Sanctioning the protectors is a change of target; and a test of reach
The logic of sanctioning the protectors is sound, and its limits are built in. The DKBA sells the one thing the compounds cannot buy on the open market: armed security in a territory the state does not control. Take away the protection and the business model frays. But the DKBA’s revenue from that protection is also what makes the group powerful, and the group has no reason to give it up because Washington has frozen assets it may not hold. The sanctions raise the cost of doing business with the DKBA; they do not remove the DKBA.
The displacement record is the strongest argument against the strategy, and the reason Washington keeps widening it. Each crackdown has pushed the industry somewhere new: from Myawaddy south to Phaya Thonezu, from big compounds to scattered smaller sites. What would make the difference is the part Washington cannot decree: enforcement by the states the compounds sit in. Thailand’s cooperation through the Strike Force is the most promising sign, but both Thailand and Cambodia have tolerated the industry for years.
Displacement, not disappearance; where the compounds go next
The first second-order effect is further displacement. If Three Pagodas Pass becomes too hot, the operators will move again; deeper into DKBA territory, into the Mulayit mountain villages 20 kilometres inside the border, or across the border. Each move makes the compounds harder to find, harder to raid and harder for trafficking victims to escape from.
The second is the effect on the victims. A compound that is sanctioned but still operating is a compound under pressure; and pressure in these places has historically fallen on the workers, not the owners. If the DKBA’s income is squeezed, the temptation is to squeeze the workforce harder, or to move workers to more remote sites where oversight is weaker.
The third is the effect on the region’s politics. Myanmar’s rulers have been lobbying Washington to invest in the country’s rare earths, and the DKBA’s ceasefire with Yangon ties the group to the military government the United States does not recognise. Sanctioning the DKBA’s commanders while engaging Myanmar’s rulers on minerals is a contradiction Washington will have to manage.
What should we watch after the designations?
Watch Phaya Thonezu first. If the Strike Force and the Thai authorities move against the compounds there, seizures, arrests, intercepted bosses, the designations will have been the warning shot before a raid. If nothing happens, the operators will read the sanctions as the cost of doing business and carry on building. Whether construction there stops now is the most immediate test.
Watch, too, for the next names, Bessent has promised more designations, and for the victims. The number that matters most is not $18.2 billion but the count of people still inside the compounds, and whether any government, with American help, gets them out. Until that number moves, the story of the scam centres is a story of money; the day it moves, it becomes a story of rescue.
What we agree on, and what remains open
Established
- On the facts. On Thursday 19 November 2026 the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC sanctioned three people and two companies over Southeast Asian cyber-scam centres: DKBA commander-in-chief General Saw Shwe Wah, Colonel Saw A One, Cambodian operator Zhao Hui, and Zhao’s two Phnom Penh companies. The DKBA was already designated in November 2025, and the State Department says the centres stole an estimated $18.2 billion from Americans in 2025.
Contested
- On whether the sanctions will work. Washington presents them as disruption of the networks that enable the compounds, and points to the Strike Force with Thailand and the extradition of the Prince Group’s founder as proof the campaign bites. Sceptics note the pattern so far is displacement, not dismantlement: after the Myawaddy raids the operators moved south to Phaya Thonezu, and the industry keeps shrinking into smaller facilities in new locations. The disagreement is not about the designations; it is about whether sanctioning the protectors closes compounds or just moves them.
Still open
- Whether any compound will close as a result.
- How many trafficking victims are inside the sites, or what will happen to them.
- Why the $18.2 billion and $7.2 billion figures differ, since neither agency has explained what the second figure covers.
- Whether Thailand and Cambodia will raid the Three Pagodas Pass sites.
- Or what the DKBA’s response will be; it has not commented.
Questions, answered
Three people and two companies: General Saw Shwe Wah and Colonel Saw A One of Myanmar’s Democratic Karen Benevolent Army; Cambodian operator Zhao Hui; and his two Phnom Penh companies, Bei Fang Bo Lin Construction Decoration and ZHZ Investment Consulting. The Treasury Department’s OFAC froze their US assets and barred Americans from dealing with them.
Washington says the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army provides security for cyber-scam compounds along Myanmar’s border with Thailand, permits their operation, and takes part in violence against trafficking victims held inside them. The group was already designated in November 2025 for supporting scam centres that target Americans with fraudulent investment schemes.
The US State Department says Southeast Asian scam centres stole an estimated $18.2 billion from Americans in 2025, most of them run by Chinese organised crime groups. Reporting on the Treasury action also cites $7.2 billion for crypto-investment fraud. Worldwide, the compounds defraud victims of tens of billions of dollars a year.
They block all property of the five targets in the United States or held by Americans, and any entity they own 50 per cent or more of is blocked too. Violations can bring civil or criminal penalties. But the DKBA holds its territory in Myanmar, so the practical effect depends on banks, and on Thailand and Cambodia acting against the compounds.
Washington promises more designations, and the Scam Center Strike Force is working with Thailand to seize evidence and intercept fleeing scam bosses. The test is Phaya Thonezu: whether the compounds at Three Pagodas Pass are raided or keep expanding. The fate of the trafficked workers inside them remains the open question.
MAGNA BUREAU