The Wire
Papua New Guinea’s prime minister tells Xi it ‘wasn’t easy’ to close Taiwan office
James Marape told Xi Jinping in Shenzhen that shutting Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby came at a domestic cost; and that his government stood by the decision. The exchange, on the eve of the APEC summit, lays bare the Pacific’s tug of war over Taiwan.
Key points
- James Marape told Xi Jinping in Shenzhen on Tuesday, 17 November 2026, that closing Taiwan’s office ‘wasn’t easy’ and that he had ‘faced challenges from within’. Reuters, 17 Nov 2026
- Taiwan announced on 6 November that it would shut its representative office in Port Moresby and stop buying Papua New Guinea’s LNG on the spot market, blaming Chinese pressure. Reuters, 6 Nov 2026
- Papua New Guinea first demanded the office’s closure on 16 July; on 6 November it gave the office head and first secretary seven days to leave, with a third diplomat allowed to stay up to a year to complete the closure. Focus Taiwan (Central News Agency), 12 Nov 2026
- Taiwan’s purchases account for roughly a third of Papua New Guinea’s LNG exports, with about 500,000 tonnes of spot purchases planned for the first half of 2026; China said on 9 November it was willing to increase its LNG imports from Papua New Guinea. Focus Taiwan, 12 Nov 2026
- Taiwan retains formal diplomatic ties with just 12 countries worldwide, three of them Pacific Island nations: Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. Reuters, 17 Nov 2026
ONE EVENT. THREE READINGS.
The story is the latest turn in a pressure campaign.
The Reuters account, and the American response it records, frame the closure as Beijing’s doing: a small Pacific state pressed, a gas market used as leverage, and an American ally’s space narrowed a little further.
What this reading highlights: The Western question is whether statements of concern are enough; Washington has called the episode intimidation, but the intimidation worked, and the count of Taiwan’s allies fell again.
Sources: Reuters (1), Reuters, via Daily Maverick (1), Reuters, via Free Malaysia Today (1)
The same facts split in two.
Beijing’s account, carried by Xinhua, reads the closure as a sovereign choice and a just act in keeping with the trend of history.
What this reading highlights: Taipei’s account, reported by its own Central News Agency, reads it as coercion: pressure applied, incentives offered, a seven-day ultimatum where a year’s notice had been agreed.
The two readings share the facts and disagree on the verb; chose, or was made to choose.
Sources: Xinhua, via Anadolu Agency (1), Focus Taiwan (Central News Agency) (1), Gutzy Asia (1)
The story is a small state’s arithmetic.
Papua New Guinea sells gas, and gas is more than 40 per cent of everything it exports; a buyer worth a third of that trade cannot be dropped lightly, and a buyer willing to replace it cannot be refused lightly either.
What this reading highlights: The Pacific reading is Port Moresby’s own: a government that relates to many nations, as Marape put it, and that chose the partner whose market is biggest.
Sources: ANI, via Tribune India (1)
Sources by lens: 3 West, 3 East, 1 Global South. See every source
THE POINT OF CONVERGENCE
Marape told Xi in Shenzhen on 17 November that closing Taiwan’s office ‘wasn’t easy’, that he faced challenges at home and stood by the decision; Taiwan announced the closure on 6 November and halted spot LNG purchases; China said it would buy more Papua New Guinea gas.
WHAT REMAINS CONTESTED
On why Port Moresby moved when it did. Taipei says Beijing applied pressure and offered economic incentives; Beijing says Papua New Guinea’s adherence to the one-China principle is a just act in keeping with the trend of history; Washington calls it intimidation; Port Moresby says it is a sovereign decision under its one-China policy.
The story
A difficult admission, made face to face in Shenzhen
Shenzhen, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape told Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday that closing Taiwan’s representative office in his country “wasn’t easy”, and said so to Xi’s face, in the opening minutes of their bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. “I faced challenges from within, because we also relate to many nations, but we were resolved,” Marape said, without elaborating on who had pressed him or what the pressure cost.
The exchange was the public coda to a diplomatic rupture that began in July and peaked this month, when Taiwan announced it would shut its Port Moresby office and halt purchases of Papua New Guinea’s liquefied natural gas. “We hope this assists you in your efforts for reunification ... because when Chinese prosper, we all prosper together,” Marape told Xi. Xi thanked him: “Under your leadership, Papua New Guinea has actively developed relations with China and firmly adhered to the ‘one China’ principle. I appreciate this.”
The meeting took place a day before the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting opens in Shenzhen, where the first meeting of Xi, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is scheduled, with the American president also in attendance.
What the record shows, from July to this week
The sequence is documented in the statements of the three governments involved. On 16 July, Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko first demanded the closure of Taiwan’s representative office, citing his country’s adherence to the one-China principle. On 6 October, Papua New Guinea gave Taiwan twelve months to complete the closure. On 6 November, Port Moresby reversed course: its foreign affairs secretary, Elias Wohengu, handed the office’s head, Chiu Chen-yu, and its first secretary, Lee Chung-nun, seven days to leave the country. A third diplomat, Pan Shao-jyun, was allowed to stay for up to a year to oversee the closure.
Taiwan’s foreign ministry announced the same day that it would shut the office, withdraw its personnel and end technical cooperation and aid programmes, and that it would stop buying Papua New Guinea’s gas on the spot market. The stakes are large: Taiwan had planned to buy about 500,000 tonnes of Papua New Guinea liquefied natural gas in the first half of 2026, and its purchases account for roughly a third of the country’s LNG exports. Gas makes up more than 40 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s total exports. On 9 November, China said it was willing to increase its LNG imports from Papua New Guinea.
The Taiwan Economic Office in Port Moresby, Taipei’s de facto embassy for 36 years, opened in 1990, and Papua New Guinea briefly recognised Taiwan in 1999 before restoring ties with Beijing. Taiwan now maintains formal diplomatic relations with just 12 countries worldwide; three of them Pacific Island nations, Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. Taipei has been lining up gas elsewhere, including a pipeline deal in Alaska.
“I faced challenges from within, because we also relate to many nations, but we were resolved,” Marape said, without elaborating on who had pressed him or what the pressure cost.
What did Marape mean by challenges from within?
Marape did not say who challenged him, or how. Nor is it known what, if anything, Beijing offered in return for the closure: China has said it will buy more gas, but no new purchase contract has been published, and the volumes, prices and timing remain undisclosed.
Other questions are open too. The formal date on which the Port Moresby office ceases to exist has not been fixed; the year allowed for winding it down runs to late 2027. What happens to Taiwan’s aid programmes, scholarships and technical missions in the meantime is undecided in public, and whether the United States will answer the closure with anything beyond words is unknown.
Why one small office carries the weight of a great-power contest
The Pacific has become the sharpest theatre of the contest between Beijing and Taipei, and the Port Moresby office was one of its markers. Every capital that drops Taiwan narrows the island’s map and strengthens Beijing’s claim that reunification is the direction of history; every capital that holds out proves the opposite. The three remaining Pacific allies, Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, will read Port Moresby’s decision as a signal about what the cost of holding out, or switching, has become.
For Papua New Guinea, the arithmetic is commercial as much as diplomatic. Gas dominates its exports, and a buyer that takes a third of its LNG is not easily replaced; China has offered to take up the slack, but a promise made at a press conference is not a signed contract. China has applied the same pressure elsewhere, including sanctions against ministers in Paraguay and Belize over their ties with Taipei; and the closure was sealed on the eve of an APEC summit where the leaders of China, the United States and Russia meet for the first time.
How to read Marape’s words in the room
The most revealing part of the meeting is not what Marape did, but where and how he described it. He chose to tell Xi, face to face and within earshot of the press, that the closure had cost him at home. That is not the language of routine administration; it is a leader presenting Beijing with a bill. “If you want to appreciate Papua New Guinea’s effort in acknowledging the fullest integrity of China in the effort to close Taiwan, it wasn’t easy,” he said, turning a diplomatic concession into a claim on China’s gratitude.
The second sentence that matters is the one about prosperity. “When Chinese prosper, we all prosper together” ties Papua New Guinea’s fortunes to China’s rise in the most direct terms a Pacific leader can use; and the line about assisting “your efforts for reunification” goes further than the formal one-China language. Xi’s reply, calling the adherence to the principle “a just act in keeping with the trend of history”, accepted the framing and returned it with interest.
The bargain underneath is visible in the numbers. Papua New Guinea trades a 36-year relationship with Taiwan, aid, scholarships, technical missions, a gas customer worth a third of its LNG exports, for deeper ties with the world’s second-largest economy and a promise of more gas sales. He has now said, in public and to Xi himself, that the decision was his and that it was hard; a statement that leaves him little room to reverse it. The backdrop is a Pacific in which Beijing’s reach is growing openly, from unannounced military drills to energy deals across the region.
What the closure sets in motion beyond Port Moresby
The first place to look is Fiji, where Taiwan still keeps a representative office and where the same pressures apply. Suva will now weigh the same calculation Port Moresby just made: the value of Taiwan’s aid and scholarships against the weight of Beijing’s market and the risk of being next on the list.
The second consequence runs through the gas trade. If China does take up the volumes Taiwan has dropped, Papua New Guinea’s export map tilts further toward Beijing, and its leverage in future negotiations tilts with it. Either way, the episode hands Beijing a template: press a small capital, offer to replace the trade that is lost, and let the arithmetic do the work.
The third runs through Washington. The State Department called the closure “yet another example of Beijing’s intimidation campaign against Taiwan and its supporters around the world”; language it has used before. With Trump in Shenzhen this week, the question is whether concern becomes policy. Taiwan, for its part, has been hardening its own defences, including new F-16V fighters and missile purchases, even as its diplomatic map shrinks.
What to watch as the APEC summit opens
The APEC leaders’ meeting opens on Wednesday in Shenzhen, and the Marape–Xi exchange will be read there as the week’s first signal: a small Pacific state has publicly priced its loyalty to Beijing, and Beijing has publicly accepted the price. Watch for any agreement signed between China and Papua New Guinea on gas, infrastructure or policing; the concrete form of the gratitude Marape asked for.
Watch, too, for Washington’s answer. The Taiwan question will be in the room whether or not it is on the agenda. A sharper American statement, a new commitment to the Pacific Islands, or silence; each would tell the region’s capitals something different about the cost of choosing sides. And watch Port Moresby itself: the gas contracts are unwritten, and the challenges Marape mentioned have not gone away.
What we agree on, and what remains open
Established
- Marape told Xi in Shenzhen on 17 November that closing Taiwan’s office ‘wasn’t easy’, that he faced challenges at home and stood by the decision.
- Taiwan announced the closure on 6 November and halted spot LNG purchases.
- China said it would buy more Papua New Guinea gas.
Contested
- On why Port Moresby moved when it did. Taipei says Beijing applied pressure and offered economic incentives.
- Beijing says Papua New Guinea’s adherence to the one-China principle is a just act in keeping with the trend of history.
- Washington calls it intimidation.
- Port Moresby says it is a sovereign decision under its one-China policy.
Still open
- What domestic challenges Marape faced, what if anything Beijing offered in return, whether China has signed new LNG purchase contracts, or when the Port Moresby office will formally close.
Questions, answered
In Shenzhen on Tuesday 17 November, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape told Chinese President Xi Jinping that closing Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby ‘wasn’t easy’ and that he had ‘faced challenges from within’. He said his government was resolved, and added that he hoped the closure would assist China’s efforts for reunification, ‘because when Chinese prosper, we all prosper together’.
Taiwan announced on 6 November that it would shut its representative office in Port Moresby and stop buying Papua New Guinea’s liquefied natural gas on the spot market, blaming Chinese pressure. Port Moresby had first demanded the closure in July and, on 6 November, gave the office’s head and first secretary seven days to leave. Taiwan said the move reflected Beijing’s use of political pressure and economic influence.
Very. Taiwan had planned to buy about 500,000 tonnes of Papua New Guinea’s LNG in the first half of 2026, and its purchases account for roughly a third of the country’s LNG exports. Gas makes up more than 40 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s total exports. China said on 9 November that it was willing to increase its LNG imports from Papua New Guinea, offering to replace the market Taiwan is leaving.
Twelve countries maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, three of them Pacific Island nations: Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. Taiwan also keeps a representative office in Fiji. Papua New Guinea briefly recognised Taipei in 1999 before restoring ties with Beijing, and its decision to close the Port Moresby office leaves Taiwan with fewer footholds in the Pacific than at any point in decades.
MAGNA BUREAU