Force structure, readiness, power projection, and deterrence: the Bureau’s strategic assessment of Central African Republic’s military capability — scored 0–100 across 24 causal dimensions.
The 29.94/100 rests first on Force mass (69.00), Land warfare (69.00), Command & control (65.00). The binding constraints: Air power (8.00), Submarine force (8.00), Nuclear survivability (6.50) — in a causal model, capability can never rise above its weakest observed link. What would move the needle: Air power (8.00) — the weak link in the spending → equipment → readiness → capability chain.
10 of 24 dimensions could not be observed (Equipment quality, ISR & intelligence, Missile forces, Air defense, Cyber & space, Strategic lift…); missing data caps the score — it never inflates it.
Assessment coverage: 60.9% — 14 of 24 dimensions observed. Kernel v10, run 2026-10-04; evidence snapshot: CIA World Factbook 2026-09-28, SIPRI arms-producer revenue, v9 nuclear taxonomy.
Kernel assessment: Air power 8.00/100 (observed).
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Kernel assessment: Land warfare 69.00/100 (observed).
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Kernel assessment: Naval power 12.80/100 (observed).
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Missile forces could not be observed in this assessment — missing data caps the score, it is never treated as zero.
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Status: Non-nuclear-weapon state; party to the NPT
Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Army (includes an air squadron, Escadrille Centrafricaine) Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), National Police (2025)
estimated 10-15,000 active FACA (2025)
most of the military's heavy weapons and equipment were lost during the 2012–2014 civil war; prior to the war, most of its inventory was of French, Russian, or Soviet origin; in recent years, it has received some donated equipment from China and Russia, including armored vehicles, drones, helicopters, jet trainer aircraft, and some light weapons (2025)
18-22 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription although the constitution provides for the possibility of conscription in the event of an imminent threat to the country (2025)
the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) are focused on internal security; since the 2013 coup, multiple armed groups have been active in the country, carrying out attacks, controlling territory, and undermining security; the coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned afterwards; over the past decade, the FACA has sought to rebuild with considerable foreign assistance, including from France, the EU, Russia, Rwanda, Uganda, and the UN; Russian private military contractors and Rwandan military forces have assisted the FACA in its operations against rebel groups the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s transitional government (2025)
MILITARY POWER 29.94/100 — The Magna Military Power score is our 0–100 measure of causal military capability — 24 dimensions (mass, equipment, readiness, projection, industry, nuclear deterrence), aggregated through a dependency graph, never by simple addition.
Momentum 0 — Quarterly momentum: the Bureau's read on the country's trajectory over the last quarter, from −10 (deteriorating fast) to +10 (accelerating).
Little moved in Jul–Sep 2026: no crisis, no windfall. The quarter simply confirmed the country's standing course.
Deeper forces — trade patterns, regional stability, institutional strength — will decide the trajectory; three months rarely do.
