A commentary published in Singapore argues that middle powers still need Washington to confront Chinese export power. The October joint statement they signed, and Beijing's answer, shows both the logic and the limits of that bet.
Published 27 October 2026 · 00:08 GMT
A commentary published in Singapore argues that middle powers still need Washington to confront Chinese export power. The October joint statement they signed, and Beijing's answer, shows both the logic and the limits of that bet. On October 7, 2026, fourteen economies joined the United States in a joint ministerial statement pledging dedicated sectoral platforms against structural excess capacity and production. The platforms cover five areas: cars and electric vehicles, batteries, chemicals, foundational semiconductors and solar panels.
A commentary published by CNA on October 27 argues that middle powers still need the United States when it comes to Chinese exports. Its author, Steven Okun, chief executive of the Singapore-based consultancy APAC Advisors, reads a recent joint statement on industrial overcapacity as a possible shift away from what the Brookings Institution has called collective handwringing about trade. The statement itself is three weeks old: on October 7, fourteen economies joined the United States in signing it. Okun's argument gives it a fresh hearing; that the middle powers, for all their frustration with Washington, have concluded they cannot face Chinese export power alone.
The United States Trade Representative announced the statement on October 7, on the margins of an OECD Trade Committee meeting. After the G20 trade ministers' meeting in Milwaukee on September 30 and October 1, the fifteen signatories declared their collective resolve to work together in new, dedicated sectoral platforms against structural excess capacity and production, calling on all countries to end non-market policies and practices that distort markets. The five sectors named are cars and electric vehicles, batteries, chemicals, foundational semiconductors and solar panels. The statement names no country, but the target is not in doubt: Washington has long argued that Chinese state-backed overproduction floods world markets. Milwaukee itself produced no G20 consensus, which is why the coalition moved outside it; as the Bureau examined when the G20 admitted it could no longer govern trade.
Almost everything operational remains open. The statement is non-binding and announces no tariff, quota or sanction; it commits the signatories to platforms and technical discussions, not to joint measures. The scope of each platform, the data the members will share and the timetable for action are all still to be defined. A second open question is the parallel United States Section 301 investigation into structural excess capacity, opened in March, which covers China and other economies; including five of the statement's own signatories: the European Union, India, Japan, Mexico and South Korea. Whether cooperation survives an investigation that treats partners as subjects is untested. A third is Beijing's response, so far a warning rather than a measure.
The stakes are the second China shock. After China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, subsidised output hollowed out manufacturing elsewhere; the Made in China 2025 programme, launched in 2015, then positioned Beijing to dominate high-technology sectors from batteries to solar panels. Domestic demand cannot absorb that output, so it is exported. Chinese-made vehicles accounted for about one in five battery-electric cars sold in the European Union in 2025, nearly half of them Chinese brands, according to the CNA commentary. Chinese groups are also gaining fast beyond China: BYD, Geely and Chery together took 22.8 percent of electric-vehicle deliveries outside China in the first eight months of 2026, up from 15.3 percent a year earlier, according to SNE Research figures cited by Korean press. Europe's response, Chinese factories on European soil, shows why tariffs alone no longer settle the question.
The commentary's central observation is a paradox the signatories embody. Five of them are under Washington's own Section 301 investigation; yet they signed a United States-led statement anyway. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put the logic bluntly at Davos in January: middle powers must act together, because if they are not at the table, they are on the menu. Former Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan told the commentary's author that the United States remains indispensable to deter Russia and balance China, while Barbara Weisel of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace called the statement encouraging because it recognises that successful action requires United States alignment with its partners. Deborah Elms of the Hinrich Foundation, by contrast, described the Trump administration's trade policy as executive-driven, coercive unilateralism; the reason the middle powers hedge even as they sign.
The pact's shadow falls on the absentees. China, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa stayed out, and coordinated action by fifteen economies could divert surplus output toward markets that did not sign; the backdoor problem the commentary warns about. Beneath the old map, researchers Bert Hofman and Tan Chia How find in a forthcoming paper that a majority of trade measures taken against China now come from BRICS and other developing countries, not from the European Union and the United States. The Global South is therefore both complainant and target here, and a coalition excluding its largest economies risks looking like a rich-country club even when the grievance is widely shared. Canada's own tariff war next door shows how quickly a middle power can move from partner to target.
Three tests come first. The technical discussions must produce a defined scope for each of the five platforms; a vague platform is a press release, not a policy. The December G20 summit in Miami will show whether the coalition widens or hardens into rival blocs. And Beijing's next step matters more than its warning: the commerce ministry said on October 15 that China opposes protectionism under an overcapacity pretext and will take necessary measures if its interests are harmed, but it has announced no countermeasure tied to the statement. Watch also European electric-vehicle sales and Chinese export volumes, and whether Paris and Berlin, who already want a European trade weapon as powerful as America's Section 301 tariffs, push the coalition from examination to action.
From Washington and Brussels, the statement reads as a breakthrough after failure. United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer warned that unchecked excess capacity will continue to cripple domestic industries and displace local production, and the coalition's move outside the G20, after Milwaukee produced no consensus, is presented as proof that like-minded economies can act without waiting for unanimity. The Western bet is that shared platforms, shared data and complementary action will do what years of parallel complaints could not.
From East Asia, the picture is more divided. South Korea's trade ministry presented the pact as a joint response to structural overproduction, and Korean reporting stressed the commercial stakes: Chinese carmakers gaining share abroad while Seoul's own producers lose ground. Singapore's commentary, meanwhile, treats the statement as evidence that middle powers still need Washington.
From the Global South, the statement is both an opportunity and a warning. Argentina and India signed it, India despite being under Washington's Section 301 investigation, while Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa stayed out. For signatories, it offers a seat at the table.
Structural excess capacity means industrial production that persistently exceeds global demand because it is sustained by government policies rather than market signals. Subsidies, cheap state-directed credit and preferential treatment keep factories running even when buyers do not need their output. The surplus is then exported, depressing prices, deterring investment elsewhere and displacing local production in importing countries.
Fifteen economies signed: Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, South Korea, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States Trade Representative announced the statement on October 7, 2026, on the margins of an OECD Trade Committee meeting, after G20 trade ministers failed to reach consensus on the issue in Milwaukee.
No. The statement does not name any country. It calls on all countries to end non-market policies and practices that distort markets and perpetuate structural excess capacity. The context leaves little doubt about the intended target: American officials have long argued that Chinese state-backed overproduction floods world markets, and Beijing answered the statement directly by warning against protectionism under an overcapacity pretext.
The signatories committed to technical discussions to define each platform's scope and to explore coordinated measures in cars and electric vehicles, batteries, chemicals, foundational semiconductors and solar panels. No tariff, quota or sanction has been announced. The next tests are whether the discussions produce concrete joint action, how the parallel Section 301 investigation evolves, and whether Beijing moves from warning to countermeasure.
