Force structure, readiness, power projection, and deterrence: the Bureau’s strategic assessment of Cuba’s military capability — scored 0–100 across 24 causal dimensions.
The 43.12/100 rests first on Mobilization (85.00), Readiness & training (85.00), Logistics (85.00). The binding constraints: Air power (8.00), Submarine force (8.00), Nuclear survivability (6.50) — in a causal model, capability can never rise above its weakest observed link. What would move the needle: Air power (8.00) — the weak link in the spending → equipment → readiness → capability chain.
10 of 24 dimensions could not be observed (Equipment quality, ISR & intelligence, Missile forces, Air defense, Cyber & space, Strategic lift…); missing data caps the score — it never inflates it.
Assessment coverage: 60.9% — 14 of 24 dimensions observed. Kernel v10, run 2026-10-04; evidence snapshot: CIA World Factbook 2026-09-28, SIPRI arms-producer revenue, v9 nuclear taxonomy.
Kernel assessment: Air power 8.00/100 (observed).
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Kernel assessment: Land warfare 72.00/100 (observed).
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Kernel assessment: Naval power 26.90/100 (observed).
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Missile forces could not be observed in this assessment — missing data caps the score, it is never treated as zero.
Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.
Status: non-nuclear-weapon state
Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR): Ground Troops (Tropas Terrestres), Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria, MGR), Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Forces (Defensas Anti-Aereas y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria, DAAFAR) Paramilitary forces under the FAR: Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil del Trabajo, EJT), Territorial Militia Troops (Milicia de Tropas de Territoriales, MTT), Defense and Production Brigades (Brigadas de Producción y Defensa, BPD), Civil Defense Organization (Defensa Civil de Cuba) Ministry of Interior: National Revolutionary Police (Policía Nacional Revolucionaria, PNR), Directorate of Border Guard Troops (Dirección de Tropas de Guardia Fronteriza, TGF), Department of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del Estado, DSE) (2025)
limited available information; estimated 50,000 active Armed Forces (2025)
the military's inventory is comprised of Russian and Soviet-era equipment (2025)
military service is mandatory for all men and voluntary for women (ages 17-28); service obligation is 24 months with the Armed Forces or the Ministry of Interior; reserve commitment for men until age 45 (2025)
the Cuban military is largely focused on protecting territorial integrity and the state; it perceives the US as its primary threat; the military is a central pillar of the Cuban regime and viewed as the guardian of the Cuban revolution; it has a large role in the country’s politics and economy; many senior government posts are held by military officers, and the FAR reportedly has interests in agriculture, banking and finance, construction, import/export, ports, industry, real estate, retail, shipping, transportation, and tourism (2025)
MILITARY POWER 43.12/100 — The Magna Military Power score is our 0–100 measure of causal military capability — 24 dimensions (mass, equipment, readiness, projection, industry, nuclear deterrence), aggregated through a dependency graph, never by simple addition.
Momentum 0 — Quarterly momentum: the Bureau's read on the country's trajectory over the last quarter, from −10 (deteriorating fast) to +10 (accelerating).
An uneventful quarter, recorded without embellishment: no breakthrough to celebrate, no setback to mourn.
The longer forces — demographics, trade routes, regional balances — kept doing what they do, and the country rode them steadily.
