Emergency stockpiles sit at multidecade lows after a record 400-million-barrel drawdown. The US reserve is at its thinnest since 1982, and one widely cited estimate says a full Hormuz closure would open a 9.3-million-barrel-a-day hole the world's remaining reserves could not cover for long.
Published 23 October 2026 · 08:03 GMT
Emergency stockpiles sit at multidecade lows after a record 400-million-barrel drawdown. The US reserve is at its thinnest since 1982, and one widely cited estimate says a full Hormuz closure would open a 9.3-million-barrel-a-day hole the world's remaining reserves could not cover for long. On March 11, the IEA's 32 members agreed to make 400 million barrels of emergency oil available — the largest coordinated release in the agency's history — with the US pledging 172.2 million barrels and Japan 79.8 million.
Dubai, October 23 — Oil prices climbed toward five-month highs this week as attacks on tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz mounted and efforts to end the United States-Israel war on Iran remained deadlocked. Brent crude, the international benchmark, rose by more than $2 to $110.85 a barrel on Wednesday, and December futures settled at $113.17 on Thursday, the highest since May, according to Korean business coverage.
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps said two tankers were "set ablaze" after hitting mines in the strait; on Thursday it claimed seven more tankers hit — four of them transferring oil overnight — though Washington dismissed the claim, the Associated Press could not independently confirm it, and the British monitor UKMTO reports October as carrying the most shipping attacks since March.
On October 22, Houthi forces claimed four missile-and-drone strikes deep inside Saudi territory — the defence ministry in Riyadh, King Fahd airport in Dammam, Abha airport and Aramco facilities at Yanbu. Aramco evacuated its Dhahran headquarters for the first time since the war began; the US State Department ordered diplomats' families out of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Against this backdrop Al Jazeera asked analysts: if both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb shut, how long could the world's reserves last?
Start with the ledger. On March 11, days after the war began on February 28, the IEA's 32 members agreed to make 400 million barrels available from emergency supplies — the largest coordinated release in the agency's history, more than double the post-2022 Ukraine volume. The US pledged 172.2 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Japan 79.8 million, per IEA figures reported by Reuters.
On October 8 the IEA said members had released 325 million barrels of the 400 promised and stood "ready to release more ... if and when required," prioritising diesel. It says members still hold about 1.1 billion barrels of publicly held emergency stocks, including 200 million barrels of diesel.
The US figure is the starkest. The SPR has fallen to 283 million barrels, its lowest since October 1982 per US Energy Department data — down from about 415 million in February. Much of the oil was lent rather than sold and must be returned with extra barrels, per the US Energy Information Administration, so the cushion is thinner than the headline suggests.
Aaron Kildow of Sparta Commodities told Al Jazeera that strategic stocks outside China and Iran have fallen nearly 327 million barrels since end-December 2025, the US, Europe and Japan accounting for about 95 percent of the draw — leaving roughly 400 million barrels of usable reserves worldwide, excluding China's stockpile and Gulf stocks a Hormuz closure could cut off. Nearly half sits in Japan; Europe holds about 76 million uncommitted barrels, though Germany is keeping some back. "Europe is the real wildcard, both on timing and willingness," Kildow said.
China's onshore crude stocks stand at 1.13 billion barrels — about 80 days of refinery intake — per Kpler's Muyu Xu. India's strategic reserves cover just eight days of imports, though New Delhi has rerouted roughly 70 percent of its crude imports outside the strait and grown its supplier base from 27 to 41 countries. Before the war, about one-fifth of the world's oil and LNG — roughly 20 million barrels a day — passed through Hormuz, the chokepoint profiled in Magna Bureau's Strait of Hormuz page; our explainer on what a full closure would mean details the mechanics. Kpler estimates a dual Hormuz/Bab al-Mandeb shutdown would remove about 9.3 million barrels a day of Middle Eastern crude.
First, the battlefield claims. Whether the IRGC struck seven tankers in one night — or two, or none — cannot be resolved from public sources; AP could not confirm the claims, Washington dismissed them, and UKMTO did not report them, though it notes some shippers have grown reluctant to report incidents. The true count matters enormously for how markets price risk.
Second, the true buffers. China is not an IEA member, and its 1.13-billion-barrel stockpile is an analytics firm's estimate, not an audited figure. Gulf producers' stocks sit inside any closure scenario's dead zone — counted as reserves while potentially unreachable. "Usable" is a judgment call, not a meter reading.
Third, release speed. Japanese and South Korean reserves can move quickly, Kildow said, but US barrels are staged over three months and Europe's contribution is uncertain, with Germany and others visibly holding stocks back. A paper reserve that needs a quarter to reach market cannot cushion a shock repriced in a week. Fourth, the diplomatic track: the war that began February 28 shows no visible off-ramp, and each tanker claim narrows the de-escalation corridor further.
The sharpest squeeze would land on diesel — nearly double the price of crude, per the IEA — since refiners would compete for diesel-rich crude grades, "a cost that ultimately lands on consumers," Kildow said. That is the channel through which a Gulf shipping war becomes a kitchen-table crisis: freight, food transport, farming and power generation all run on diesel.
Chris Beauchamp of IG Group told Al Jazeera the world was lucky after the first closure. "The salient feature of March and beyond was how a crisis didn't actually develop. We got away with it," he said. "I don't think the global economy will be as lucky next time if there is a protracted conflict. A month or two is all we have." His price call: $150 a barrel becomes "a very distinct possibility, which then sees significant demand destruction."
The pain would not be uniform. Most Gulf exports in September and October went to Asian buyers; India and Pakistan are among the most exposed, and the nearest alternative crude — West Africa — is 25 to 28 days away by sea, against two days from the UAE's Fujairah. Our India country profile tracks how New Delhi has been rewiring its energy security. The politics are combustible too: US gasoline is expected to struggle below $4 a gallon before the November 3 midterms, and Europe is entering winter with record-low gas reserves, per the IEA chief.
Strip away the claims, and the story is a buffer being consumed. The IEA was built in 1974, after the Arab oil embargo, so importers would never again be price-takers at gunpoint; members must hold at least 90 days of net imports. The 400-million-barrel release was the sixth coordinated action in the agency's history — and the first where the buffer itself, not just the market, visibly approaches its design limits within a single year.
Geopolitically, the chokepoint has become the weapon. Neither side needs to win a battle to move the price of bread in Lagos or Lyon; it needs only to keep the insurance desks and shipping ledgers nervous. The Houthi blockade at Bab al-Mandeb, the mine claims in Hormuz, the strikes on Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline — each pulls the same lever: the world's largest daily energy artery.
Economically, the fine print matters. Much of the US drawdown was structured as loans — traders contracted to return up to 1.25 barrels for every barrel taken, deliveries starting next year. That softens the long-term accounting but hardens the short-term reality: oil that must come back cannot be spent twice. Historically, the 2022 release of 180 million barrels was absorbed within a year; this time the drawdown started from a smaller base and the conflict shows no negotiated pause. Demographically, the exposed end of the pipeline is Asia — the largest demand growth sits in countries with the thinnest buffers and the longest alternative sea routes, an asymmetry no release schedule can fix.
Follow the money: it flows, perversely, toward producers far from the Gulf. In this year's second quarter ExxonMobil reported earnings of $14.5 billion — its highest in four years — Chevron $12 billion, its best in six years, and Shell more than doubled earnings to nearly $10 billion, their profits largely down to high oil prices. A second shock would send refiners scrambling for supplies from the US, Latin America, West Africa and Russia, per Kpler's Xu — letting non-Middle Eastern producers benefit from higher prices. In August, Donald Trump said ExxonMobil and Chevron were "making too much money based on a shortage."
The second-order squeeze is refining. Wars in Iran and Ukraine have damaged refineries and disrupted tanker traffic, driving diesel to record highs in many markets — which is why the IEA and the G7 are now prioritising diesel releases specifically. Gulf refinery outages would hit diesel output first and hardest.
The third ripple is corporate and human: Aramco evacuating its Dhahran headquarters and the US withdrawing diplomats' families from the Gulf are signals markets read faster than any communiqué. And India — the template exposed importer — is now planning strategic reserves of crude, LPG and LNG covering up to a month of demand, a direct institutional response to this year's shock.
Clock one: the release schedule. On October 7 the IEA agreed to accelerate releases and prioritise diesel — completing announced releases could bring around 100 million barrels to market, though analysts caution this is not necessarily a fresh intervention of that size. Days earlier the G7 agreed to immediately release 100 million barrels of crude and diesel.
Clock two: the return pipeline. Much of the US programme was structured as exchanges, with companies contracted to return borrowed volumes plus premium barrels in 2027 and 2028. Whether those barrels come back on schedule — or are swallowed by the next shock — decides whether the buffer rebuilds or merely treads water.
Clock three: winter. Europe is entering the heating season with record-low gas reserves per the IEA chief, diesel markets are at record tightness, and peak winter demand has not arrived. The next shock would land not on a comfortable market but an exhausted one. If the tankers keep burning in Hormuz and the diplomats keep packing in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Beauchamp's "month or two" will be tested as an inventory fact, not an analyst's flourish.
The Western wire record — Reuters on the IEA releases and the SPR drawdown, the agency's own October statements — frames this as a managed but thinning buffer: record interventions deployed competently, members holding another 1.1 billion barrels publicly, G7 diesel releases staged for winter. The risk, in this telling, is depletion arithmetic: how many months of releases the system can sustain before the buffer itself becomes the crisis.
The East Asian coverage reads the same facts through the importer ledger. Korean business reporting tracks Brent's five-month high and the Houthi strikes as supply-chain events — Aramco's evacuation, tanker insurance, gasoline politics. Indian outlets translate the reserves question into days of cover: eight days of strategic imports, 70 percent of crude rerouted outside Hormuz, suppliers grown from 27 to 41.
The Global South information environment — Al Jazeera's explainer from Doha, Nigerian coverage of the tanker claims — centres the question that opened this report: how long could the world last. Its analysts' answer, "a month or two," lands hardest on countries with no buffer to burn and no alternative sea route. In this telling the reserves are not a ledger but a clock — ticking loudest where the margin for error is smallest.
The IEA says members still hold about 1.1 billion barrels of publicly held emergency stocks, including 200 million barrels of diesel, with 325 million of the record 400-million-barrel March release delivered. But one widely cited estimate puts truly usable reserves outside China and the Gulf at only 400 million barrels — and the US reserve sits at 283 million, its lowest since 1982.
Analysts are doubtful for long. Kpler estimates a full Hormuz closure plus a blocked Bab al-Mandeb would remove about 9.3 million barrels a day of Middle Eastern crude. Against roughly 400 million barrels of usable reserves in the most pessimistic estimate, IG's Chris Beauchamp says the world has "a month or two" — and reserves cannot in practice be released that fast.
Asian importers with thin reserves. Most Gulf exports go to Asian buyers; India and Pakistan are most exposed, and India's strategic reserves cover only eight days of imports. The nearest alternative crude, West Africa, is 25 to 28 days away by sea versus two days from the UAE's Fujairah. Diesel — nearly double crude's price — would squeeze freight, farming and food transport everywhere.
The IEA agreed October 7 to accelerate remaining releases — about 100 million barrels still to come under the March programme — prioritising diesel. Days earlier the G7 agreed to immediately release 100 million barrels of crude and diesel. But much of the US drawdown was structured as loans due back with premium barrels in 2027-2028, and analysts warn releases cushion a physical shortfall; they cannot fix it.
