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Voices · Opinion

Malika Ahardane

Morocco correspondent — global consumer brands, marketing, and corporate power. Signed columns, each an argument; the views are the correspondent’s own.

Opinion — the views in these columns are the correspondent’s own.

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Portrait of Malika Ahardane

Correspondent · Based in Casablanca

Global consumer brands, marketing, and the corporations that decide what the world buys.

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Career

I sell to the world for a living — and I watch what the world buys. Since October 1999 I have been a Marketing Manager at Procter & Gamble, working with some of the largest consumer brands on the planet: Johnson & Johnson, Bank of America, Sony Entertainment Music, L’Oréal. My beat is the boardroom decision that lands on your shelf — the launch, the rebrand, the price move — and what it reveals about who really holds power in the global economy.

What shaped my lens: a quarter-century inside the machinery of global marketing — the campaigns, the portfolios, the multinationals that decide what billions of people reach for every morning. I write about corporations the way a mechanic reads an engine: for what is actually connected to what.

Based in Casablanca, I cover global consumer brands, marketing, and corporate power.

Personal

Based in the Casablanca area, Morocco. An MBA graduate of the University at Albany, SUNY — GPA 3.67, captain of the volleyball team — with a BA also mentioned from the University of Southern California. 500+ LinkedIn connections.

Timeline

  • 1993–1999 — MBA, University at Albany, SUNY (GPA 3.67; volleyball captain)
  • 1999–present — Marketing Manager, Procter & Gamble, Casablanca area (clients include Johnson & Johnson, Bank of America, Sony Entertainment Music, L’Oréal)
  • 2026 — Columnist on consumer brands, marketing, and corporate power, Magna Bureau
Opinion The dollar & American power

The Dollar’s Secret Weapon Isn’t Liquidity. It’s a Courtroom.

The dollar’s obituaries arrive on schedule, and they all make the same category error. They treat the dollar as money. It isn’t. It’s a legal claim — and claims are only as good as the courtroom behind them.

Strip a reserve currency to its plumbing and you find something unromantic: a promise to pay, enforceable somewhere. Central banks don’t hold dollars the way you hold cash in a wallet. They hold Treasury securities — claims on the United States government — and those claims derive their value from the most boring superpower on earth: American courts will enforce them, American property law will protect them, and no president can quietly rewrite them without the bond market staging an immediate revolt.

This is why every dedollarization scheme dies at the same fence. Gold? Unseizable, yes — and sterile. It pays no yield, settles no invoice, and moving a billion dollars of it requires an armored convoy and a prayer. The yuan? A formidable currency attached to a legal system where the state is always the senior partner in the courtroom. Try explaining to your reserves manager that her portfolio’s safety now depends on winning a lawsuit in Beijing against a Chinese state bank. Watch her face.

The sanctions wave of 2022 is usually cited as the dollar’s original sin — proof that reserves can be frozen. Read it the other way: the freeze worked because the claims were real. Half of Russia’s reserves were immobilized precisely because they were enforceable claims in Western jurisdictions. You cannot seize what isn’t legally legible. The weapon proved the asset.

“Nobody holds dollars because they love America. They hold them because American law is the only landlord that can’t change the locks.”

Consider the graveyard of alternatives. The IMF’s Special Drawing Rights — a reserve asset designed by committee, used by nobody for anything that matters. Bilateral swap lines — useful plumbing, but plumbing is not a foundation; nobody denominates their grandchildren’s savings in swap lines. Crypto’s stablecoins — dollar-denominated, which rather gives the game away: even the revolution prices itself in the incumbent. The full money landscape tells the same story: rails multiply, the courthouse doesn’t.

None of this means the dollar’s share of reserves won’t keep drifting down — it has, from over 70 percent to under 60, and glaciers move. But the drift is diversification, not dethronement. Central banks are buying gold and signing swap lines the way nervous homeowners buy insurance: not because they expect the house to burn, but because insurance is cheap relative to the nightmare.

The dollar will not die by spreadsheet. It dies the day some other jurisdiction offers what America offers: deep markets plus courts that enforce contracts against the sovereign itself. Nobody is building that. China’s capital controls forbid it; Europe’s capital markets can’t unify it; gold can’t litigate. Until then, the reserve system rests on the least glamorous pillar of American power — not the carrier groups, not the Fed, but a few thousand judges in black robes who will, reliably, tell even the government that a contract is a contract. The Bureau’s Factbook country grades keep scoring American institutional depth top of the table for exactly this reason.

“Dedollarization keeps failing for the same reason revolutions fail in winter: nobody built a courthouse first.”

So file the obituaries under fiction. The dollar’s empire was never really about money. It was about law — and law, unlike liquidity, cannot be printed.

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Opinion America's debt machine

The World's Largest Debtor Pays the World's Lowest Rent

This week, like every week, the United States will walk into the bond markets of the world and borrow another mountain of money — from pension funds in Tokyo, from sovereign funds in the Gulf, from your grandmother's 401(k). The gross federal debt now runs at roughly $37 trillion. Interest payments alone approach a trillion dollars a year. And the world keeps lending — because, as Washington never tires of discovering, there is simply no other game in town.

Consider the ritual itself, because the ritual is the tell. On the Treasury's auction schedule — posted with the punctuality of a train timetable — the world's deepest borrower sells the world's safest IOUs: three-month bills on Mondays, notes and bonds through the week. A screen flickers in a quiet room in Washington; primary dealers click in their bids; a bid-to-cover ratio prints; and the whole affair is over in minutes. It is the dullest, most consequential auction on the planet. Trillions a year change hands with less ceremony than a parking ticket.

And here is the marvel: the auctions almost always clear. Year after year, crisis after crisis, the world's largest debtor walks up to the counter and pays the world's lowest rent. The arithmetic would ruin anyone else. Net interest on the debt — roughly a trillion dollars a year — now rivals, and by some measures exceeds, the entire defense budget. The deficit is no longer an emergency measure; it is a lifestyle. Every administration arrives promising discipline, and every administration discovers a war, a pandemic, a recession, or a tax cut that makes discipline someone else's problem.

Why does the world stand for it? Because of depth — that most unromantic of superpowers. The Treasury market is the deepest pool of liquid assets on earth: when a central bank in Seoul or a pension fund in Oslo needs to park ten billion dollars by Friday, there is exactly one parking lot big enough. The rule of law helps; the dollar helps; but mostly it is the cold logic of liquidity. When the storm comes, you want the harbor with the most water — even if the harbor master is up to his eyebrows in debt. Economists call this the cleanest dirty shirt in the laundry. The shirt is, admittedly, filthy. It is also the only one on the rack.

“America's debt is not a bug in the system. It is the system — the world's savings account, denominated in dollars.”

Now look at the refinancing wall, because this is where the arithmetic gets personal. The mountains of debt sold at near-zero yields in 2020 and 2021 — the pandemic bargains — are maturing, and they are being rolled over at four or five percent. Each maturing tranche quietly reprices the empire's rent upward. The weighted-average interest rate on the whole stock of debt climbs a little every year, the way a tide comes in: imperceptibly, then all at once. A single percentage point of extra yield across the refinancing calendar is worth hundreds of billions of dollars a year — real money, even in Washington. The exorbitant privilege has a variable-rate clause.

And then there is the theater — because no discussion of American debt is complete without the debt ceiling, that beloved Washington ritual in which the government votes to spend the money, then holds a separate, more dramatic vote on whether to pay the bill. Congress has raised, extended, or suspended the ceiling more than a hundred times; each episode is presented as a cliffhanger and resolved as a formality. The markets have learned to treat it the way one treats a toddler's tantrum: alarming the first time, then just Tuesday. It is a peculiar kind of theater — a country negotiating with itself over whether to honor its own debts, while the whole world watches and lends anyway.

And so the weather falls unevenly — again, always again. While Washington borrows without blinking, finance ministers in the Global South are lectured by the IMF on fiscal virtue by the very system whose biggest member has never once practiced it. There is something almost theatrical about the arrangement: the world's largest debtor gets to set the global risk-free rate, and everyone else's debt gets priced off it. When Treasury yields rise to finance American largesse, a finance minister in Nairobi watches his own borrowing costs rise in sympathy — for sins he did not commit, at rates he did not choose. The polite word is spillover. The impolite one is shorter.

Meanwhile the East is not sermonizing; it is hedging. Beijing has been trimming its Treasury holdings for years — quietly, methodically, the way one exits a crowded theater. Central banks across Asia and the Middle East have been buying gold at a pace not seen in half a century: the one reserve asset that belongs to no debtor. But note the elegance of the trap: nobody can leave quickly. A disorderly exit from Treasuries would crater the value of one's own remaining reserves — mutually assured solvency, you might call it. So the great diversification proceeds at the speed of a glacier: unstoppable, undramatic, and measured in decades.

What happens next? The crash theorists have been wrong for forty years, and they will keep being wrong, because the system does not end in a bang. It ends — if it ends — in a tax. Inflation is the classic silent tax: melt the real value of the debt while savers pay. Financial repression is the polite version: hold rates below inflation and let time do the confiscating. Or the world simply diversifies, decade by decade, until the rent Washington pays starts to look less like a privilege and more like a market price. None of these is a collapse. All of them are a bill.

“The Treasury does not sell bonds. It sells the privilege of standing next to the exit — and charges admission.”

None of this is an argument for panic. It is an argument for reading the box score. The dollar's empire of debt works precisely because everyone is too exposed to walk away — the most successful hostage situation in financial history, conducted entirely in public, with full disclosure. The Bureau's sovereign grades still have American credit winning going away. But the rent always comes due, in one currency or another. The only real question is whether Washington will keep acting surprised at every installment — and how long the rest of the world keeps smiling as it signs the check.

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Opinion Money & power

Money's Second Schism: After the Single Settlement System

Sanctions, swap lines, and stablecoins are rebuilding the pipes beneath money along geopolitical lines — and money was a settlement system all along.

For most of living memory, money was boring plumbing.

A dollar moved the way water moves: through pipes nobody thought about, toward wherever the bill said it should go. SWIFT, the correspondent banks, the dollar-clearing desks in New York — the whole apparatus was infrastructure, like roads. You do not have opinions about roads. You just drive.

Then the roads started acquiring border guards.

What has happened over the past decade is not the death of the dollar, as the pamphleteers keep announcing, nor its triumph, as the old faithful keep insisting. Something stranger is underway: the fragmentation of the rails beneath money. The pipes are being rebuilt along geopolitical lines — and money, which we mistook for a neutral substance, is turning out to have been a settlement system all along. Change the rails, and you change what money is.

The anomaly we called normal

Begin with the unexamined premise: that one money, for one world, is the natural order of things. It is not. It is an idea roughly sixty years old, and for most of human history it would have sounded like a fever dream.

The Hanseatic merchants settled in whatever cleared — silver, bills of exchange, the reputation of the counterparty. The sterling era was universal money in name and British money in fact; it worked because the Royal Navy kept the pipes open and London kept the ledgers honest. Bretton Woods was the first genuinely global settlement consensus, and it lasted exactly as long as the United States was willing to run the deficits required to supply the world with dollars — the Triffin dilemma, in the flesh. The petrodollar era that followed was a masterstroke of recycling: oil priced in dollars, surpluses parked in Treasuries, everyone locked into the same pipe by mutual convenience.

Convenience, however, is a contract. And contracts get renegotiated when one party discovers the pipe has a valve — and that someone else holds the handle.

The weaponization that worked — and what it taught

The exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT and the immobilization of roughly half of Russia's central bank foreign reserves in 2022 was, by the standards of financial warfare, a masterpiece. Reserves — the most liquid asset on earth, the thing central banks hold precisely because it is supposed to be untouchable — were touched.

The lesson was not lost on the rest of the planet. Every central banker east of Vienna did the arithmetic. If reserves can be immobilized, they are not reserves; they are deposits with the prosecuting authority. Gold purchases surged to multi-decade highs. Bilateral currency-swap agreements multiplied. The Bank for International Settlements would later call it, with characteristic understatement, "the diversification of the global payments architecture."

Diversification is the polite word. The accurate one is secession.

And here is the irony the sanctions architects are still digesting: the weapon worked, and working was the problem. A threat that is never used deters; a threat that is used teaches. The world learned the lesson in one fiscal quarter, and the tuition was permanent.

Money was never a thing. It was a corridor. And corridors can be rerouted.

Three rails where one used to be

The emerging landscape has a shape. Call it the triple rail.

The first rail is the dollar-euro system — still dominant, still by far the deepest, but now visibly conditional. Sanctions compliance has become a load-bearing wall of correspondent banking; a payment that touches the wrong jurisdiction can be seized, not merely delayed. The rail works beautifully, for those in good standing. Standing, however, is no longer a permanent status. It is a reviewable one.

The second rail is the sovereignty track: China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), the ruble-yuan corridor, India's rupee-settlement experiments, Gulf states quietly pricing energy deals in whatever clears fastest, the BRICS clearing chatter that never quite becomes a currency but never quite dies either. These are not challengers to the dollar so much as escape hatches from it — narrower, slower, but outside the checkpoint's reach. Note the strategic modesty: nobody on this rail is trying to replace the dollar. They are trying to survive it.

The third rail is the digital wildcard: stablecoins and tokenized deposits, settling in minutes over networks no central bank fully controls. They began as crypto's answer to slow banks and became something more interesting — the first genuinely stateless payment rails with dollar-scale volume, now used as everyday money from Buenos Aires to Beirut. The old system spent fifty years building pipes; the new one rented them from the internet.

Three rails. Different conductors, different timetables, different tolls. The single system is gone, and it is not coming back.

A parable of gauges

In the nineteenth century, Russia built its railways to a wider gauge than the rest of Europe. The official reason was engineering. The strategic reason was that no invading army could roll its trains straight onto Russian track. Standardization is an invitation; non-standardization is a moat.

The fragmentation of money is a gauge war. Each rail is deliberately, usefully incompatible with the others. A yuan settled through CIPS does not convert frictionlessly into a dollar at a New York desk — and that friction is the point. The moat is the product.

This is why the debate over whether the dollar "will survive" misses the point so completely. Of course it survives. The standard gauge still carries most of the world's freight. The question is what share of freight is willing to pay the standard-gauge toll — and what happens to pricing power when a fifth, a quarter, a third of the world's settlement starts traveling on rails where Washington does not set the schedule.

There is a precedent, and it is not reassuring. When sterling lost its monopoly as the settlement currency, the transition took thirty years, two world wars, and a depression to complete. The rails were rebuilt mid-journey, with the freight still moving. Nobody voted for it. Nobody announced it. One day the timetables simply favored a different station.

The trilemma nobody asked for

Central banks now face a genuine trilemma: access to the deep dollar rail, sovereignty over their own settlement, and speed. They can have any two.

Gold gives sovereignty at the cost of speed — it is nobody's liability and everybody's settlement problem. Stablecoins give speed at the cost of sovereignty — your payment clears in seconds on a network whose governance you do not attend. The sovereignty rails give sovereignty at the cost of depth — they settle, but shallowly, at a discount.

There is no fourth option waiting in the wings, which is why every serious central bank is quietly doing all three at once: buying gold, studying tokenized deposits, and signing swap lines with everyone who will sign. Diversification of money is no longer a hedge. It is a job description.

For ordinary people, the fragmentation arrives as friction: remittance costs that vary by corridor, compliance questionnaires that read like visa applications, currencies that move against you depending on which pipe your money happens to travel through. The tax on geopolitics is paid at the retail counter, as it always is — in the spread, in the delay, in the form.

What the map demands

The strategic conclusion is uncomfortable in its simplicity: think of money as a choice of rails, not a unit of account. The institutions that thrive in the interregnum will be fluent in all three systems, arbitraging the seams between them. The ones that discover their single-pipe strategy was a single point of failure will learn it the way all hard lessons are learned — expensively, and in public.

And here is the darkest irony of the whole affair, worth savoring: the architects of fragmentation were the system's own defenders. Every sanctions package laid another kilometer of the alternative tracks. The armor proved so heavy that the rest of the world built lighter railways. The dollar was not dethroned. It was outmaneuvered by its own bodyguards.


The last time the world ran on fragmented settlement rails, the map was drawn by empires with navies. This time it is drawn by servers, sanctions lists, and swap lines — softer instruments, sharper edges. But the underlying truth is the one the goldsmiths understood before any of it: money is not the metal, the paper, or the token. It is the agreement to settle, and the rails on which the agreement runs.

The rails are splitting. Money is following. It was never a thing at all.

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