Force structure, readiness, power projection, and deterrence: the Bureau’s strategic assessment of Russia’s military capability — scored 0–100 across 24 causal dimensions.
The 81.43/100 rests first on Combat experience (100.00), Nuclear deterrence (100.00), Cyber & space (95.50). The binding constraints: Overseas basing (59.00), Naval power (58.40), Air power (8.00) — in a causal model, capability can never rise above its weakest observed link. What would move the needle: Air power (8.00) — the weak link in the spending → equipment → readiness → capability chain.
2 of 24 dimensions could not be observed (Missile forces, Air defense); missing data caps the score — it never inflates it.
Assessment coverage: 95.7% — 22 of 24 dimensions observed. Kernel v10, run 2026-10-04; evidence snapshot: CIA World Factbook 2026-09-28, SIPRI arms-producer revenue, v9 nuclear taxonomy.
Kernel assessment: Air power 8.00/100 (observed).
| Type | Count | Role | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Su-57 Felon | 29 approx | Multirole stealth fighter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Su-35S Flanker-E | 118 118+, ongoing losses | Air superiority fighter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Su-34 Fullback | source range 142-163; ongoing war losses | Strike fighter-bomber | source 2026-10-04 |
| Su-30SM/SM2 Flanker-H | 110 110+, ongoing losses | Multirole fighter | source 2026-10-04 |
| MiG-31 Foxhound | source range 128-247; ongoing losses | Interceptor | source 2026-10-04 |
| MiG-29 Fulcrum | 256 | Multirole fighter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Su-27 Flanker | under 422 per source; mixed variants, ongoing losses | Air superiority fighter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Su-25 Frogfoot | 175 | Close air support | source 2026-10-04 |
| Su-24 Fencer | 259 | Strike bomber | source 2026-10-04 |
| Tu-160 Blackjack | 17 | Strategic bomber | source 2026-10-04 |
| Tu-95MS Bear | 46 | Strategic bomber | source 2026-10-04 |
| Tu-22M3 Backfire | 55 | Long-range bomber | source 2026-10-04 |
| Il-76 Candid | 130 | Strategic airlifter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Il-78 Midas | 20 | Aerial tanker | source 2026-10-04 |
| Ka-52 Alligator | 135 | Attack helicopter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Mi-28 Havoc | 94 | Attack helicopter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Mi-24/35 Hind | 323 | Attack/transport helicopter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Mi-8/17 Hip | 777 | Utility/transport helicopter | source 2026-10-04 |
| Mi-26 Halo | 45 | Heavy-lift helicopter | source 2026-10-04 |
Land and air counts reflect pre-Ukraine-war baselines minus documented losses; the Ground Forces source page states estimates as of 2025 are highly uncertain. Topol-M, R-36M2 and UR-100N ICBMs being retired in favor of RS-24 Yars.
Kernel assessment: Land warfare 91.04/100 (observed).
| Type | Count | Role | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| T-90M Proryv | 620 approx; includes pre-war T-90A baseline | Main battle tank | source 2026-10-04 |
| T-72 (all variants) | 1,470 ~1,000 older + 470 B3/B3M; ongoing losses | Main battle tank | source 2026-10-04 |
| T-80 (all variants) | 600 | Main battle tank | source 2026-10-04 |
| T-62 | 600 reactivated from storage | Main battle tank | source 2026-10-04 |
| BMP-3 | 650 | Infantry fighting vehicle | source 2026-10-04 |
| BMP-2 | 550 | Infantry fighting vehicle | source 2026-10-04 |
| BMP-1 | 750 | Infantry fighting vehicle | source 2026-10-04 |
| BTR-80/82 | 1,200 | Armored personnel carrier | source 2026-10-04 |
| MT-LB | 2,500 active | Tracked armored vehicle | source 2026-10-04 |
| 2S19 Msta-S | 450 | Self-propelled howitzer | source 2026-10-04 |
| 2S3 Akatsiya | 600 | Self-propelled howitzer | source 2026-10-04 |
| BM-21 Grad | 650 | Rocket artillery | source 2026-10-04 |
| BM-30 Smerch | 100 | Heavy rocket artillery | source 2026-10-04 |
| TOS-1A Solntsepyok | 36 | Thermobaric MLRS | source 2026-10-04 |
| 9K720 Iskander-M | 162 launchers; ~600 missiles stockpiled as of June 2025 | Short-range ballistic missile | source 2026-10-04 |
Land and air counts reflect pre-Ukraine-war baselines minus documented losses; the Ground Forces source page states estimates as of 2025 are highly uncertain. Topol-M, R-36M2 and UR-100N ICBMs being retired in favor of RS-24 Yars.
Kernel assessment: Naval power 58.40/100 (observed).
| Type | Count | Role | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSBN (Borei / Delta IV) | 14 | Ballistic missile submarine | source 2026-10-04 |
| Oscar II-class SSGN | 6 | Cruise-missile submarine | source 2026-10-04 |
| Nuclear attack submarines | 18 | Nuclear attack submarine | source 2026-10-04 |
| Diesel-electric attack submarines | 19 approx | Conventional submarine | source 2026-10-04 |
| Admiral Kuznetsov | 1 in commission but not operational | Aircraft carrier | source 2026-10-04 |
| Kirov-class battlecruiser | 2 | Nuclear battlecruiser | source 2026-10-04 |
| Slava-class cruiser | 2 | Guided-missile cruiser | source 2026-10-04 |
| Destroyers (Udaloy / Sovremenny) | 8 | Guided-missile destroyer | source 2026-10-04 |
| Frigates (Admiral Gorshkov / Grigorovich) | 12 | Guided-missile frigate | source 2026-10-04 |
| Corvettes | 79 approx | Corvette / light frigate | source 2026-10-04 |
| Landing ships | 17 | Amphibious landing ship | source 2026-10-04 |
Land and air counts reflect pre-Ukraine-war baselines minus documented losses; the Ground Forces source page states estimates as of 2025 are highly uncertain. Topol-M, R-36M2 and UR-100N ICBMs being retired in favor of RS-24 Yars.
| Type | Count | Role | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| RS-24 Yars | 210 210+ deployed: 180 road-mobile + 30+ silo, late 2025 | ICBM | source 2026-10-04 |
| RSM-56 Bulava | Borei-class SSBNs; missile inventory not public | SLBM | source 2026-10-04 |
| Kh-47M2 Kinzhal | air-launched (MiG-31K); inventory not public | Hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile | source 2026-10-04 |
| S-400 Triumf | Aerospace Forces regiments; launcher count not public | Long-range SAM | source 2026-10-04 |
| S-300 / S-300V4 | Ground Forces; inventory not public | Long-range SAM | source 2026-10-04 |
| S-500 Prometheus | limited deployment reported; numbers not public | Strategic air/BMD defense | source 2026-10-04 |
| Buk (M1/M2/M3) | 310 | Medium-range SAM | source 2026-10-04 |
Land and air counts reflect pre-Ukraine-war baselines minus documented losses; the Ground Forces source page states estimates as of 2025 are highly uncertain. Topol-M, R-36M2 and UR-100N ICBMs being retired in favor of RS-24 Yars.
Status: NWS
Estimated stockpile: ~5,420 warheads (estimate, https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/).
Delivery: Triad: RS-24 Yars / Topol-M ICBMs, Bulava SLBMs, Tu-160/Tu-95MS bombers
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Ground Forces (SV), Aerospace Forces (VKS), Navy (VMF); separate or independent troop branches include the Airborne Forces (VDV), Missile Troops of Strategic Purpose (RVSN; commonly to as Strategic Rocket Forces), Special Operations Forces, and Unmanned Systems Forces Federal National Guard Troops Service of the Russian Federation (FSVNG, National Guard, Russian Guard, or Rosgvardiya) Federal Security Services (FSB): Federal Border Guard Service (includes land and maritime forces) (2025)
estimated 1.1-1.2 million active Armed Forces; estimated 350,000 Federal National Guard Troops (2025)
the Russian Federation's military and paramilitary services are equipped with domestically produced weapons systems, although in recent years Russia has imported military hardware from external suppliers such as Iran and North Korea to support its war on Ukraine; the Russian defense industry is capable of producing a full range of advanced air, land, missile, and naval systems; Russia is one of the world's largest exporters of military hardware (2025)
18-30 years of age for compulsory service for men; 18-65 years of age for voluntary/contractual service; women and non-Russian citizens (18-30) may volunteer; minimum 12-month service obligation (2025)
estimated 600,000 in Ukraine; more than 20,000 additional military personnel deployed in former Soviet states and elsewhere, including Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Moldova, Syria, sub-Saharan Africa, and Tajikistan (2025)
the Russian military is responsible for protecting the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, providing maritime security, and supporting Moscow's national security objectives, including projecting influence and power abroad and deterring perceived external threats; its missions include air, land, maritime, strategic missile, and expeditionary operations; it is also active in the areas of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space; the Russian military's focus is its ongoing war on Ukraine and the perceived threat from NATO and the US in February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, beginning what is the largest war in Europe since World War II ended in 1945; Russian military forces occupied Ukraine’s province of Crimea in 2014, and Moscow subsequently backed separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine with arms, equipment, and training, as well as Russian military troops, although Moscow denied their presence prior to 2022 Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war at the request of the Syrian Government from September 2015 until the collapse of the ASAD regime in December 2024; it was Moscow’s first overseas military expeditionary operation since the Soviet era; Russian assistance included air support, arms and equipment, intelligence, military advisors, private military contractors, special operations forces, and training; Russia seized the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force in 2008 (2025)
MILITARY POWER 81.43/100 — The Magna Military Power score is our 0–100 measure of causal military capability — 24 dimensions (mass, equipment, readiness, projection, industry, nuclear deterrence), aggregated through a dependency graph, never by simple addition.
Momentum +8 — Quarterly momentum: the Bureau's read on the country's trajectory over the last quarter, from −10 (deteriorating fast) to +10 (accelerating).
New Delhi was the stage: Putin drew a hard red line on European troop deployments in Ukraine and locked a $100B annual trade target with India for 2030.
Back-channel diplomacy accelerated — envoy Dmitriev in Washington in late September, Witkoff and Kushner in Moscow — while the sanctions-proofed economy kept growing. A quarter of defiance paying off.